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FXCENT DECISIONS. 67
REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
MONOPOLY-PURPOSE OF SHERMAN ACT-COMBINATION BE-
TWEEN PRODUCERS-ILLEGALITY OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS.
In the recent case of Utated States v. American Linseed Oil Company, U.
S. Supreme Court Advanced Opinions, No. 17, July 2, 1923, page 693, it was
held that when competitors agree to be associated as producers of a particular
commodity for the purpose of "securing intelligent competition" or "open com-
petition." to "eliminate unintelligent selfishness" and "establish 100 per cent con-
fidence," all to the end that members might stand out from the crowd as sub-
stantive co-owners under modem co-operative business methods, they unlaw-
fully combine "in restraint of trade" forming a monopoly which is inhibited by
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The defendants were large manufacturers and distributors of commodities
restricted by limited supplies of raw material (linseed), located at widely sep-
arated points and therefore conducting independent enterprises along customary
lines, suddenly became parties to an agreement which took away their freedom
of action by requiring each to reveal to all the intimate details of its affairs. All
subjected themselves to an autocratic Bureau, paid large fees, and deposited
funds to insure their obedience. With intimate knowledge of the affairs of
other producers and obligated as stated, but proclaiming themselves competitors,
the subscribers went forth to deal with widely separated and unorganized cus-
tomers necessarily ignorant of the true conditions, which plainly showed that
they were not competitors. The Court says: "Certain it is that the defendants
are associated in a new form of combination, and are resorting to methods
which are not normal * * * The situation here is wholly unlike an exchange
where dealers assemble and buy and sell openly; and the ordinary practice of re-
porting statistics to collectors, stops far short of the practice which defendants
adopted. Their manifest purpose was to defeat the Sherman Act without sub-
jecting themselves to its penalties * * * The Sherman Act was intended to se-
cure equality of opportunity and to protect the public against evils commonly
incident to monopolies and those abnormal contracts and combinations which
tend directly to suppress the conflict for the advantage called 'competition'-a
free play of those contending forces ordinarily engendered by honest desire for
gain.
The statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual
contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agree-
ment or otherwise. The words in restraint of trade should be given the mean-
ing which would not destroy the individual right to contract, as to make it im-
possible to carry on the business of interstate commerce along the usual chan-
nels of business, for if it so interfered, it would defeat the object for which it
was enacted, namely to protect the competition of trade. The Court further
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says: "We are not called upon to say just when or how far" competitor. may
reveal to each other the details of their affairs. In the absence of an intention
ta monopolize, or the compulsion that results from a contract or agreement; the
individual may exercise great freedom of contract; but concerted action through
combination presents a wholly different problem and it is forbidden when the nec-
essary tendency is to destroy the kind of competition that the public have long
looked for protection."
In the American Column and Lumber Company v. United States, 257 U. S.
377, the Court says of that case, "we considered a combination of manufacturers
got up to effectuate this new conception of confidence and competition, and held
it within the inhibition of the Sherman Act because of its inevitable tendency to
destroy real competition, as long understood, and thereby restrain trade. Our
conclusion there cannot be reconciled with the somewhat earlier opinion and
judgment of the court below. They are in direct conflict."
There has been a growing tendency on the part of producers, manufacturers
and other business enterprises to organize for the regulation of prices of their
respective products or materials, which has forced upon the courts the neces-
sity of construing the clause "in restraint of trade" more liberally and to bring
such organizations under the inhibition of the Sherman Act. This case goes a
little further, illustrating how the courts must meet new situations under old
law. So when competitors attempt to evade its provisions by declaring their
purpose to be otherwise then their actions indicate, the court will look at the
facts, as in this case, and render the decision in the light of what was actually
done under the agreement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GUARANTY OF LIBERTY-PROHIBITION
OF TEACHING OF GERMAN LANGUAGE NOT VALID EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER.
In the recent case of Meyer v. State of Nebraska, Supreme Court Advance
Opinions, page 698. the Supreme Court of the United States held as unconsti-
tutional a law prohibiting the teaching of any foreign language to children who
had not graduated from the eighth grade. The State sought to justify the law
on the ground that such a measure is only a reasonable exercise of its police
power and has for its purpose the protection of the public interest. Children
are able to devote but comparatively few hours to school each day, and conse-
quently this limitation necessitates a selection of the studies; and it is contended
that such a selection by the State is a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The theory on which the constitutionality of the statute is attached is that
it violates that liberty which is guaranteed to the individual by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. The court refrains from giving a definition of
the "liberty" guaranteed but points out some things that have been included in
various interpretations of the Amendment; namely, freedom from bodily re
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss1/7
